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Introduction
Before the first democratic elections in South Africa, there was 
no national entity that was responsible for water supply and 
sanitation in the country. The responsibility was fragmented 
and allocated to the local government in the previous four 
independent states, six self-governing territories and the 
dominant Republic of South Africa territory. This resulted 
in differing levels of service.  The first democratic election 
in 1994 saw the National Department of Water and Forestry 
(DWAF) taking responsibility for addressing the sanitation 
service delivery backlog in the country. A budget of several 
million rand was allocated annually to addressing this need 
and the responsibility of ensuring that this money was ap-
propriately spent rested heavily on this Department. However, 
an assessment of the Census 2001 results indicated that at 
the time, the number of households lacking basic sanitation 
services was approximately 4.7 million (Statistics South Af-
rica, 2003) (assuming that basic sanitation services included 
flush toilet and (VIPs)). This amounts to approximately 18 
million people or 42% of the population.
Provision of sanitation facilities to the poor remains a 
major challenge in the country. Those who have inadequate 
sanitation facilities have bucket systems, unimproved pit 
toilets or use the bush. When sanitation systems are lacking 
or inadequate, the impact on the health of the community and 
the negative impact on the environment can be extremely 
serious. This was witnessed by an epidemic outbreak of 
cholera in August 2000 in South Africa.
The 2000/2001 Cholera outbreak in South Africa.
From August 2000 to June 2001, South Africa experienced 
one of the worst cholera epidemics in the country’s recent 
history. The outbreak was linked to outbreaks in Mozambique, 
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Swaziland and Zambia (WHO, 2002). By December 2002, 
South Africa had reported a total of 151 852 cholera cases 
to WHO (WHO, 2000b).
In the 2001 outbreak WHO (2002) reported that Africa 
accounted for 94% of the total global cholera cases, of which, 
South Africa accounted for 58% of the cases in that year. Most 
of the cases reported in South Africa during this outbreak 
were located in the KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) province but it 
rapidly spread to other provinces. It is important to note that 
the Case Fatality Rate (CFR) levels for the year 2001, where 
South Africa experienced the worst cholera outbreak (peaking 
at 106 151 reported cases), the country also recorded one of 
the lowest CFRs at 0.22%. The overall global CFR declined 
to 1.48% in 2001, as compared to 3.6% in 2000, owing to 
the extremely low rate recorded by South Africa (WHO, 
2002). The fact that the country dealt with the outbreak in 
an open and transparent manner, contributed to demystify-
ing the disease. The efforts to combat the epidemic involved 
government at all levels and included interventions such as 
access to potable water, sanitation, and education.
This paper compares the two approaches, i.e. conventional 
approach to sanitation which was implemented before the 
cholera outbreak to the fast-track approach which evolved 
as a result of the outbreak.
The conventional approach to rural sanitation 
delivery in South Africa
Before the 2000/2001 cholera outbreak, sanitation pro-
grammes in KZN were implemented mainly through two 
funding sources i.e. through the DWAF funded Commu-
nity Water Supply and Sanitation (CWSS) programme and 
through NGO funders. 
The government funded CWSS programmes were imple-
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mented in two phases, namely, Phase A and Phase B. The 
Phase A programme involved capacity building of project 
management structures for the administration of these 
projects, development and execution of a health and hygiene 
awareness campaign, training of key village representa-
tives to implement the programme and the construction of 
demonstration toilets. Phase B entailed the continuation of 
the health education programme with reduced inputs from 
the consultants and the provision of latrine facilities, which 
met the basic RDP standards. i.e. VIP or their equivalent. 
The health and hygiene awareness programme continued in 
phase B, aimed at promoting community participation and 
ownership and creating a long-term sanitary health monitor-
ing programme within the communities. 
A Sanitation Impact Assessment carried out on the CWSS 
sanitation programme in 2001(CSIR, 2001), concluded 
that:
• Health and Hygiene awareness campaigns did not always 
result in behaviour changes
• Environmental conditions were not always conducive 
to the construction of VIPs
• Some superstructure design flaws existed i.e. particularly 
zinc superstructures
• Material quality use in some projects was unaccept-
able
• Operation and maintenance training had been neglect-
ed 
• The poorest-of-the-poor were unable to afford the 
monetary contribution required for the construction of 
a VIP
• The elderly and disabled were not provided for
• The implementing process of projects often resulted in 
long delays between phase A and B 
• The subsidy amount of R600 for the construction of a 
toilet was too low and was not changing with inflation
• The implementation of sanitation programmes was very 
slow
• The organization capacity to implement these pro-
grammes was weak at all levels of the programme
An evaluation of the Phase A stage (SANTAG et al., 
2001) of a similar programme in the Uthukela District of 
Kwa ZuluNatal highlighted the need for more women to be 
employed during the phase B implementation; the project 
steering committee had a weak understanding of financial 
matters relating to the project; there was no clear direction 
pertaining to how pits would be emptied when full; there 
was also a need for a greater awareness particularly relating 
to subsidy application and knowledge of the project role 
players and lastly, the evaluation showed that health and 
hygiene awareness campaigns should focus on infective 
organisms that are spread from hand to mouth and from 
mouth to hand.
Accelerated sanitation programmes in Kwa 
– ZuluNatal
Two districts were allocated emergency funding for the 
implementation of accelerated sanitation programmes dur-
ing the cholera outbreak of 2001i.e. Ugu and Uthungulu 
Districts. These districts were selected based on high in-
cidents of cholera in the area and a high level of need for 
sanitation facilities.
The aim of the programmes was to implement an acceler-
ated sanitation programme to help in the prevention of the 
spread of cholera by promoting community awareness of 
sanitation and health and hygiene and by constructing toilet 
facilities in cholera affected areas.  Fast-track programmes 
were implemented outside the standard Phase A/Phase B 
implementation approach, with these programmes being 
implemented in a single Phase. Awareness, capacity building, 
training, construction and health and hygiene activities were 
implemented as a single stream within these programmes.
An evaluation of the Ugu and uThungulu fast-track sanita-
tion programmes carried out in February 2003 highlighted 
a number of lessons learnt from these programmes (DWAF, 
2003). Lessons learned were that:
• Fast-track programmes require strong project manage-
ment on a full time basis 
• Dictating rates for Contractors does not allow for incen-
tives for the work to be completed within a minimum 
timeframe 
• Contract rates should be based on the size of the pro-
gramme, the extent of the interventions and the capa-
bility of the Contractor and not on a percentage of the 
programme cost 
• The ordering of materials should only be done from 
suppliers that have been awarded a watertight contract 
for material supply and installation 
• Rushing to spend the allocated budget before the end 
of the financial year resulted in the real reason for the 
programmes being compromised i.e. the control of the 
spread of cholera through change in sanitation and hy-
giene behaviour 
• Fast-track programmes should clearly define roles and 
responsibilities for all stakeholders 
• Lastly, according to DWAF, 2003, sanitation project 
steering committees have to operate differently in an 
accelerated programme.
It was recommended that a fast-track sanitation programme 
only be implemented where no other options are available. 
Although this type of intervention is ideal for the rapid con-
struction of sanitation facilities, the areas of the intervention 
that should be key to the programme i.e. changing of sani-
tation habits and hygiene behaviours tend to be ignored or 
only touched on during the fast-tracking process. The main 
cholera intervention targets are therefore, not achieved. For 
successful implementation of a fast-track programme, more 
than the usual amount of financial and human resources must 
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be made available and sufficient time should be taken in the 
planning and design of the programme (DWAF, 2003).
Comparison of sanitation implementation 
approaches at a programme level.
A comparison of the standard Phase A/Phase B and the 
fast-track sanitation programmes was done at a project 
level by one of the implementing agents in KwaZulu-Natal 
(Aquamanzi, 2002). This Implementing Agent (IA) had 
submitted a Business Plan (BP) in January 2000 for the 
implementation of sanitation projects in seven villages in 
the province. This Business Plan was approved in March 
2000 and was based on the standard sanitation approach of 
Phase A/Phase B. The BP planned the construction of 9156 
toilets. By October of the same year, the only construction 
that had taken place within the villages was the Demonstra-
tion toilets. Human resource and financial expenditure had 
been concentrated on an extensive awareness and training 
campaign within the villages.
With the outbreak of cholera in the province in August 
2000, the same IA submitted a Business Plan for a fast-track 
sanitation programme in another seven villages. The Busi-
ness Plan, showed the planned construction of 9245 VIPs 
within these villages (refer to Table 1)
A comparison of the two programme approaches shows that 
in 20 months of the implementation of the standard sanita-
tion programme, the highest number of toilets constructed 
in any one village was 712. This was however, only 85% 
of the planned toilets. In the fast-track sanitation approach, 
five of the original seven villages had 100% completed the 
construction of toilets within eight months of implementa-
tion of the programme.
A comparison of the total interventions shows that within 
eight months of the implementation of the fast-track pro-
gramme, 95 % (8551) of the planned toilets had been com-
pleted. This equated to 1 068 toilets being constructed per 
month. However, the standard sanitation approach had only 
shown 35 % (2 361) of the planned construction completed 
within 20 months of implementation.  This equated to 118 
toilets per month. 
The fast-track sanitation programme had delivered almost 
four times the number of sanitation facilities in less than half 
the timeframe of a standard sanitation programme.
Comparison of sanitation implementation 
approaches at a provincial level
A comparison of the programmes at a provincial level 
yielded similar results to the project level review. Acceler-
ated sanitation programmes had delivered over 5 times more 
sanitation facilities in almost half the time of a standard 
sanitation programme.
In addition, the cost per household for a standard sanitation 
programme is higher than that of the accelerated intervention 
programme (refer to figure 1). Since the cholera outbreak of 
2000/2001 all new sanitation programmes within the prov-
ince are implemented in a similar manner to the accelerated 
sanitation i.e. programmes no longer implemented with Phase 
A and Phase B but rather as an ongoing process. The choice 
of sanitation technology/interventions in these programmes 
is based on affordability, acceptability, accountability, attain-
ability, appropriateness, accessibility and awareness.
Concerns and successes of the fast-
track sanitation programme
The concerns and successes of the accelerated sanitation 
programme included:
Table 1. Details of Aquamanzi Standard and
Accelerated Sanitation Programme (Aquamanzi,
2002)
Programme
Type
District
Municipality
Village Name No. of planned
toilets
Nguthu 1 1400
Nguthu 2 706
Umzinyathi
Ndantshana 840
Masulumane 1 560
Madidima 850
Godide 2800
Phase A
/Phase B
Uthungulu
Kwambonambi 200
TOTAL 9156
Illembe Glandale 2040
Madlebe 1 800
Madlebe 2 1600
Buccanaa 611
Dondotha 800
Mazimazana 2194
Accelerated
sanitation
Uthungulu
Nkanini 1200
TOTAL 9245
Figure 1. Cost per household and number of  
toilets Constructed during the two  
Sanitation programmes in KwaZulu-Natal  
(CSIR & HSRC, 2003)
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Census 2001 show, South Africa still has a long way to go to 
achieve their target of clearing the sanitation service backlog 
by 2010.  Meeting this and the Millennium Development 
Goals will require massive human and financial resource 
inputs as well as serious political will and commitment.
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• Delivery of Sanitation Facilities: The accelerated sani-
tation programme has made a significant impact in the 
delivery of sanitation facilities to rural areas in KwaZulu-
Natal. 
• Compromising of Health and Hygiene programmes: The 
fast-tracking of sanitation delivery during the cholera 
outbreak resulted in the health and hygiene components 
of the programme being compromised. The focus was on 
infrastructure delivery rather than on behaviour modifica-
tion.
• Single Phased Sanitation Delivery: The fast-tracking 
process combines the Phases of a project, expedites 
sanitation delivery and reduces sanitation costs.
• Local Technologies: The use of local materials in the 
construction of technologies vastly reduces the cost of a 
sanitation unit, and hence the projects were able to reach 
the poorest-of-the-poor. 
• Combining Projects: The implementing of more than 
one project within the same District/Municipality/area 
greatly reduced the cost of implementation. 
• New Sanitation Policies: The cholera outbreak has 
prompted the design and development of Kwa Zulu-Natal 
Provincial Sanitation Strategy that includes a section 
on Health and Hygiene. It is through this strategy that 
Health and Hygiene materials were developed in Kwa 
Zulu-Natal, these are now used country wide to benefit 
other communities. 
Lessons learned 
Many sanitation lessons were learned from the cholera out-
break in 2000 / 2001.  It highlighted that sanitation should 
receive a higher level of prioritisation within the water 
services implementation programme. Water and sanitation 
delivery should be implemented simultaneously and long-
term sanitation programmes should be designed and planned. 
School and community sanitation programmes should be 
implemented by one agency under the responsibility of lo-
cal authorities. Sanitation programmes should draw on local 
labour and bring the widest possible range of benefits to the 
community. In addition, the system of Community Health 
Workers (CHW) should be strengthened and expanded. 
Lastly, that health and hygiene promotion should involve 
advocacy and education.
Conclusion
Since the cholera outbreak, government‘s attention has been 
focused on delivery of sanitation. However, as the results of 
